statutory schemes, 9 no scholar or jurist has explored the normative value of maintaining the Doctrine in the first instance.o This Article begins that discussion.
Beginning with the positive discussion, Part II of this Article discusses the tortured historical evolution of the Doctrine in three sections. Section A discusses the early jurisprudential history of the Doctrine, beginning with the Court's original approach to the framework in Rigsby" and Borak.1 2 Section B then discusses the advent of the Cort" analysis and the Court's inconsistent articulation and application of Cort's principles over the course of the four years between the delivery of Cort and the delivery of Cannon.
14 This Section additionally discusses the delivery of Cannon and the Court's movement from its Cort-based framework to its textualist-based framework. Section C then discusses the Court's application of its textualist approach in Touche and Transamerica,' 6 with particular emphasis on the Court's inconsistent articulation and application of its textualist framework. Finally, this Section discusses the inconsistent manner that the federal courtsincluding the Supreme Court-have defined and applied the framework for the past thirty years.
Part III continues the discussion begun in Part II by explaining the reason for the inconsistencies in the jurisprudential line and ultimately assesses the nominal positive benefit of maintaining the Doctrine as it currently exists. Specifically, Section A argues the inconsistencies in the Doctrine's jurisprudential line are a result of the Court's enervation of the Doctrine. That is, as the Court moved from the Rigsby framework to the textualist framework, application of the Doctrine became more difficult and thus more inconsistent because it was less grounded in discerning Congress' objective reason for enactment-an analysis grounded, at least in part, in text-and more focused upon Congress' intent to create an implied right-an analysis that exists in the absence of text. Using Section A as a foundation, Section B discusses the continuing utility of the Doctrine as a means of determining Congress' intent and argues that maintaining the Doctrine preserves a 10. No scholar has argued for the complete abolition of the Doctrine. One jurist has made a summary argument for its abolition. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]f the current state of the law were to be changed, it should be moved in precisely the opposite direction-away from our current congressional intent test to the categorical position that federal private rights of action will not be implied."). And, one jurist has argued to significantly bridle the Doctrine. See, e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing private rights of action should not be implied "[albsent the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent"; otherwise, the Doctrine encroaches upon the separation of powers). But, even those jurists did not explore and weigh the normative impact of abolition.
11. nominal positive benefit in remote, isolated circumstances. Section C then shifts the focus from the Doctrine itself to one of its primary corollaries-the concept of legislative context-and argues that the concept of legislative context has minimal beneficial value, as its applicability is both limited to remote, isolated circumstances and inherently based upon speculative factual predicates. Part IV places the nominal value of maintaining the Doctrine discussed in Part III in juxtaposition with both structural and substantive theory. Specifically, Section A examines the Doctrine in light of Administrative Justice Theory and argues the Doctrine substantially encumbers administrative justice by generating judicial waste. Section B then discusses the Doctrine in light of Procedural Justice Theory and evaluates the Doctrine's effect using three different cornerstones of the theory-voice, neutrality, and consistency. This Section argues abolition would have a neutral impact on voice, as, even if abolition occurred, other avenues of exercising voice would remain. But, continuing to maintain the Doctrine could negatively impact both neutrality and consistency because the Doctrine fosters reasonable perceptions of non-merit-based decision-making. Finally, Section C evaluates the Doctrine in light of Corrective Justice Theory and argues the Theory no longer forms a sound normative basis for maintaining the Doctrine for two reasons: First, the doctrinal purpose underlying contemporary implied-rights jurisprudence is inconsistent with Corrective Justice Theory. And, second, even assuming the first were not true, abolition of the Doctrine would have a neutral impact on the Theory. Taking all of these arguments together, this Article ultimately argues the Doctrine is not normatively justifiable.
I. THE TORTURED EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
The evolutionary history of the Doctrine is best articulated as a series of three epochs-the early history, the Cort period, and the modem, textualist period. This 17. This Article does not attempt to assess the Doctrine's value against every bedrock legal theory, as most are either inapplicable to it or would result in unproductive discussions. Thus, for example, this Article does not address the Doctrine's impact on Deterrence Theory. At a basic level, Deterrence Theory argues that humans are rational actors who prospectively evaluate the benefits and penalties associated with their conduct. E.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544* 55 (2003) . Using that as a postulate, Deterrence Theory then argues there is some optimum penalty whose risk is greater than the potential benefits achieved by prohibited action. Id. Once identified and set as a counter-balance, that risk will then deter rational actors from engaging in undesirable conduct as the result of a conscious or unconscious cost-benefit analysis. Id. While it is reasonable to believe that implied rights, once recognized and applied by courts, may form a basis for Deterrence Theory to operate, see, e.g., T. James Lee, Jr., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, Plain Language and the Implied Right ofAction Under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 269, 294 (1995) (arguing the existence of an implied right of action for violations of Securities Exchange Act provides a deterrent to non-compliance), the question of whether the Doctrine should continue to exist is not properly evaluated in such a broad manner. Rather, to evaluate the beneficial value of the Doctrine in light of Deterrence Theory, the inquiry would need to be cabined to one question: does the possibility that a federal court might imply a private right of action deter parties from violating federal statutes? While it is certainly possible that actors could be prospectively deterred from prohibited action on the basis that a court could create an implied right of action for private parties, the argument seems intuitively fantastical. This is particularly true, given the rarity with which courts recognize new implied rights. See infra Part IV.A.
Part follows that basic structure, tracing the growth of the Doctrine from its infancy in Rigsby to its twilight in the modem era.
A. The Early History of the Doctrine
The early history of implied private rights of action is somewhat like the big bang-at first there was nothing but within moments a jurisprudential universe appeared." This early expansion was due to the Supreme Court's broad, summary review of the issue in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) . In Rigsby, the plaintiff worked for the defendant railway company as a switchman, and in the course of his duties, fell as a result of the railway company's negligence.
1 9 The plaintiff subsequently sued the railway company, alleging violations of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 20 an Act which provided no explicit cause of action.21 After a trial on the merits, the district court instructed the jury that liability existed and then charged the jury to determine damages. 22 The circuit 23 court affirmed these instructions.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
There can be no question . .. that the [statute] was intended for the especial protection of employees engaged in duties such as that which 24 plaintiff was performing . . . '[n every case, where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.' 25 Stated differently, under Rigsby, the implication of private causes of action was the 26 rule as opposed to the exception, leading to the extension of implied private rights of action in a variety of areas.2 18. The Court in Rigsby stated that the principles inherent in its ruling date back to much earlier common law presumptions. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39. This, at least in part, has led some scholars to argue that implied rights of action under federal statutes existed prior to the Court's holding in Rigsby. Eg., Stabile, supra note 8, at 864 n. 15. This position, however, is inconsistent with statements made by the Court. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66* 67 (1992); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689. Furthermore, the instances preceding Rigsby wherein the Court hinted at a framework for implied rights of action under federal statutes were all either provided in dicta, see, e.g., Great N. Ry 19. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 36. 20. The lawsuit was solely premised upon section 2 of the Act's 1910 amendment, which provided: "All cars must be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient hand brakes; all cars requiring secure ladders and secure running boards shall be equipped with such ladders and running boards, and all cars having ladders shall also be equipped with secure hand holds or grab irons on their roofs at the tops of such ladders." Id. at 37. Thereafter, for nearly fifty years, the early jurisprudence for private causes of action focused on an analysis nearly identical to negligence per se principles extant in tort.2 That is, the Court's analysis focused solely on two facets: First, was the statute intended to protect this particular type of plaintiff. And, second, was the plaintiff injured in a manner envisioned by the statute.29 The Rigsby framework, however, eventually began to doctrinally erode, moving away from a common law, negligence per se approach and beginning to focus on Congress' implicit intent o-a change that presumably correlated with the rise of more sophisticated and complex 31 statutory schemes.
The first explicit coalescence of that movement was recognized in the Court's opinion in Borak.
In Borak, a stockholder sued a company, alleging the company violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1958), by distributing false and misleading proxy material.3 The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that section 27 of the Act provided no private right of action for violations of section 14(a). Rather, the district court held the sole remedy for violations of section 14(a) was declaratory relief. The court of appeals subsequently reversed, holding an implicit private right of action for remedial relief existed."
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed. Basing its reasoning on the "broad remedial purposes" of the statutory scheme, the Court held that private rights of action were a "necessary supplement to [agency] action . .. and indeed a "most effective weapon in the enforcement" of the statutory scheme. 3 8 Thus, the Court held that in such circumstances, "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. purposes.
B. The Advent of Cort Analysis and the Movement towards a Singularity
The Borak holding maintained precedential value until the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash.44 In Cort, the Supreme Court created a four-part analytical scheme to determine whether a private right of action exists under a federal statute. 45 First, the scheme required courts to determine whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."
46 Second, the courts were required to discern whether Congress had indicated-either explicitly or implicitly-its intent to extend or deny a private right of action. 47 Third, the courts were required to determine whether implication of a private right of action was consistent with the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme. 48 Finally, the courts were required to determine whether the action was the type traditionally relegated to the states. 49 The confusion that exists regarding the framework for implied-rights cases stems from this holding.
Although the Cort factors test initially appeared to state a concise framework for evaluating implied-rights cases, the framework created more questions than answers. For instance, the Court's articulation did not indicate whether each of the factors would be required or whether one factor may weight more heavily than others-thus permitting the absence of one or more factors if one factor was particularly strong. Questions of that nature were further exacerbated by the Court's inconsistent application of the principles. For instance, not even one year after delivering the opinion in Cort, and at its first opportunity to apply the framework, the Supreme Court already began to stray from the framework. In Ernst & Ernst,so the Court was confronted with the question whether scienter was a required element of a cause of action pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act." In reaching its holding, the Court did not mention the Cort framework.52 Furthermore, the Court relied solely on statutory text to reach its conclusion, subsequently bolstered its conclusion with legislative history, only addressed the purposes of the statutory scheme in a rebuttal argument, and failed to mention regulation by the states entirely." Although it could fairly be said that the Court's divergence from the Cort framework was a reaction to the nature of the claim-the claim was to discern the elements of an existing implied right of action as opposed to discerning whether an implied right existed in the first instance-the case does not stand alone in this regard. Rather, Ernst & Ernst represents the beginning of a trend wherein the Court failed to apply Cort analysis both in circumstances where the Court was reviewing attempted extensions of existing rights and the actual creation of new rights. Two years after delivering its opinion in Cort, the Supreme Court first discussed the Cort analysis in Chris-Craft.
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But rather than solidifying the Cort framework by applying it, the Court in Chris-Craft only addressed the Cort factors as a means of bolstering its holding. In Chris-Craft, the Court, again interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, held that a tender offeror did not have a private right of action pursuant to section 14(e)." In reaching that holding, the Court premised its analysis on a combination of legislative history and a discussion of whether implication would effectuate Congress' remedial purposes-principles from both Cort and Borak. Only as an afterthought and only after reaching its conclusion did the Court mention or explicitly apply the Cort framework."
The confusion created by Chris-Craft was then compounded in Santa Fe." Just as with Chris-Craft, the Court in Santa Fe was addressing the Securities Exchange Act. Specifically, the Court was tasked with determining whether Section 10(b) and regulation lOb-5 prohibited acts short of manipulation or deception." The Court held they did not, premising its holding solely on the statutory language. After reaching its holding, the Court then bolstered its decision by discussing the third factor of Cort-the effectuation of Congress' intent-and the fourth Cort factor-regulation by the states." Thus, in a light most favorable to the Cort In Brown, the Court addressed whether the disclosure provisions in the Freedom of Information Act provided a private right of action. The Court held they did not, premising its decision, in conformance with Santa Fe, solely upon the text of the statute. After reaching its holding, the Court then addressed legislative 62 history to bolster its decision. While the Cort decision is mentioned twice in the opinion, the framework is not articulated in its substance, is not stated as controlling, and is not applied. The Brown opinion is instructive for two reasons: First, as mentioned a moment ago, it demonstrated that the Court's reluctance to apply the Cort framework was not limited to actions pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act. Second, it demonstrated that the Court's reluctance to apply the Cort framework was not premised upon the distinction between analyzing the extension of previously implied rights and implying rights in the first instance.4 Rather, on the heels of Brown, it appeared a new pattern was perhaps emergingtaking Ernst & Ernst and Brown together, it appeared the primary consideration for implying private rights would be the statutory text. But, that pattern still left a piece of the puzzle missing-the Court's holding in Chris-Craft.
Four years after delivering the opinion in Cort, the Court delivered its opinion in Cannon 61-both the first and the last time the Court would both state the framework in Cort as controlling and apply all of its factors. In Cannon, the plaintiff, a female, sued the University of Chicago, alleging she was denied admission to medical school on the basis of her gender in violation of section 901
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of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1682 (1976). The district court subsequently granted the University of Chicago's motion to dismiss, holding that section 901 did not provide either an explicit or implicit private right of action.
The court of appeals thereafter affirmed on similar grounds." Additionally, the court of appeals held that the administrative grievance procedure contained within Title IX was the exclusive means of enforcing its provisions. 0 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed," basing its decision on the four factors originally outlined in Cort. Referring to the first Cort factor, the Court-for the first time-stated that the analysis centered around the existence of "right-or duty-creating language."
72 Right-or duty-creating language, the Court stated, must focus upon a particular, identifiable class of beneficiaries as opposed to stating a general prohibition or providing for protection of the general public." Thus, the Court held that it has historically been willing to extend implied private rights of action in circumstances wherein the language of the statute either created a specific right for a particular person (right-creating languafe) or provided a particular prohibition against conduct (duty-creating language). Applying this framework to Title IX, the Court held Title IX explicitly conferred a benefit upon a class of persons of whom the plaintiff was a part-all people who are discriminated against on the basis of gender in an educational program or a program receiving federal financial assistance.
Referring to the second Cort factor, the Court stated that the analysis is governed by the existence of legislative history indicating Congress intended to either extend or deny private rights of action." That having been said, the Court stated, "[i]n situations . . . 'in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action [in the legislative history] . . . .'"" But, an intention to restrict a private right of action will nevertheless be controlling. In the context of Title IX, the Court held the legislative history unambiguously indicated an intent to extend a private right of action. The Court premised this conclusion on two primary grounds. First, the Court held that the legislative context indicated a congressional intent to extend private rights of action." Specifically, the Court noted that prior to the passage of Title IX, the federal courts had previously found that Title VI created an implied private right of action. from floor debates, House reports, and Senate reports that indicated congresspersons believed the language in Title IX was "identical" to the language in Title VI, with only minor exceptions not relevant to the inquiry." Thus, the Court, invoking its policy of assuming legislative actors are aware of judicial interpretations of existing statutory law, held that Congress' use of "identical" language indicated its intent to achieve-or at least acquiescence in-an identical result. 82 Second, the Court held that the general statutory scheme for providing attorneys' fees in a companion section, combined with the legislative history of that companion section, explicitly presumed the existence of an implied right of action." Specifically, after reviewing floor debates and Senate reports, the Court held a clear presumption existed that congresspersons believed the companion section would entitle persons to pursue remedies. 84 In terms of the evolution of the jurisprudential line, Cannon added three measures: First, Cannon added the right-or duty-creating analysis-a measure that would forever change the line. Second, the Court limited its analysis of the second Cort factor to legislative history-a measure that would also change the line. Finally, the Court destroyed any perceived pattern that could be garnered from the combination of Ernst & Ernst and Brown-at least the pattern the Court seemed to create before it issued its holding in Cannon. As to the first and second measures, although Cannon's statement of the first Cort factor is consistent with Cort's initial articulation, Cannon 's attempt to form a unifying principle for the jurisprudential line with the concept of right-or duty-creating language created a confusion between the first and second Cort factors that both expanded the first Cort factor and narrowed the second Cort factor. Specifically, the right-or duty-creating analysis would ultimately become a mechanism to focus the Court's attention to Congress' intent to both benefit a class of beneficiaries and create a private rightthe latter of which was, at least pursuant to Cort, reserved for the second Cort factor. Furthermore, and in a similar vein, the right-or duty-creating analysis would relegate the second Cort factor to a mere discussion of legislative history, a result consistent with the analysis provided in Cannon of that factor but inconsistent with Cort's articulation of discerning Congress' "explicit or implicit" intent to create a private right. As to the final measure, the Court's opinion in Cannon, in combination with the opinions in Ernst & Ernst and Brown, demonstrated a unified pattern for the Court's use of the Cort framework-the Court used the framework in cases where it implied private rights of action and did not use the framework in cases where it declined to extend a private right." Framed slightly differently, when the Court could dispositively determine Congress' intent to not extend a right by resorting to the statutory text alone, the Court declined to address the Cort principles as a mechanism of reaching its decision. That pattern, nascent as it may be, ultimately became the foundation for the Court's textualist articulation in remaining Cort factors was unnecessary. Third, the Court solidified the use of the right-or duty-creating analysis expressed in Cannon as a mechanism to determine the existence or non-existence of congressional intent. 9 And, more importantly, the Court used that right-or duty-creating analysis in a manner consistent with Cannon. The Court read the right-or duty-creating language test as encompassing not only the "especial benefit" test encompassed in Cort's first factor but also an "intent to create a private right" test that, according to Cort, should have been allocated to the second factor. 10 The Court held that it did provide a limited right of action for an equitable remedy for rescission, basing its opinion, yet again, solely on the statutory text.10o In reaching that holding, the Court did not indicate the Cort framework was controlling, did not explicitly mention the "especial benefit" factor, and did not mention the right-or duty-creating analysis. o0 Rather, the Court summarily stated: "It is apparent that the two sections were intended to benefit" those similarly situated to the plaintiff.' Furthermore, again summarily, the Court stated that the legislative history supported that conclusion. But, the Court stated, the inquiry could not end there. Rather, the Court still needed to determine whether Congress intended that the benefit would be enforceable in private litigation-an issue on which the Court held the legislative history was "entirely silent."'o The Court thus returned to the statutory language and held the language alone implicitly intended to create a private right.
After holding a limited private right for an equitable remedy existed, the Court then confronted the question whether a private claim for damages existed. On that question, the Court held a private right for damages did not exist.'o9 The Court began its analysis by stating that the statutory scheme explicitly provided both judicial and administrative remedies. construction principle that where Congress provides a specific remedy, "it includes the negative of any other" remedy."o That statutory construction principle, however, could yield, where a contrary legislative intent can be found.'I To discern the legislative intent, the Court reviewed the statutory text of the Act, previously enacted versions of the Act, previously un-enacted versions of the Act, and companion legislation. Based upon that evidence, the Court held no private right for damages existed.11 2 Notably, the Court did not use the right-or dutycreating analysis the Court found dispositive in Touche" and arguably Cannon."14 Furthermore, the Court did not provide the Cort framework as controlling authority."' Rather, the Court only referenced the framework in a rebuttal argument.
While the Court's holdings in Transamerica are consistent with the holdings in Touche, Transamerica's analytical structure regarding the application of the first and second Cort factors is inconsistent with the analytical structure in Touche. Furthermore, Transamerica's analytical structure is inconsistent with the pattern formed by Ernst & Ernst,"' Brown," 8 
and Cannon."'
As to the first inconsistency, while initially appearing identical to the analysis in Touche and consistent with the analysis in Cannon, Transamerica's analysis, at least as ultimately informed by the language in the Court's rebuttal, is structured much more closely to the framework initially espoused in Cort. Specifically, in Cort, the first two factors were delineated as follows: First, a court should determine if the statute benefitted an especial class.120 Second, a court should determine whether Congress intended-either explicitly or implicitly-to create a private right of enforcement.
When Transamerica's analysis is combined with the Court's rebuttal discussion, it appears that is what the Court did. In its analysis, the Court first began by noting that the statute was intended to benefit a specific class of persons.122 The Court then used indicia of legislative intent to determine whether Congress intended to create a private right. And, the Court analyzed both of these factors-separately-without mentioning the right-or duty-creating language test.123 Although the Court's analysis does not explicitly indicate it is using the Cort framework, as the Court does not mention the framework in its primary analysis,1 24 the Court's rebuttal confirmed that it was in fact using the first two Cort factors in its primary analysis by indicating that it need not review the other two Cort factors-the third and fourth factors. ' This structure stands in contrast to the structure espoused-not even one year earlier-in Touche, as the Court did not use the right-or duty-creating language and did not combine the first and second Cort factors.126
As to the second inconsistency, while the Court found that a private right of action existed for equitable remedies, the Court did not mention the Cort framework and did not apply at least two of the Cort factors.' 27 Rather, the Court clearly referred to the first Cort factor-the especial benefit factor-albeit summarily, indicated no legislative history existed, and then proceeded to find the implied right within the statutory text itself. Thus, Transamerica's analysis broke the pattern that was previously developing in Ernst & Ernst, Brown, and Cannon. That is, on previous occasions, while the Court did not apply the full Cort analysis when it declined to extend private rights, 12 the Court did apply the full Cort analysis in the circumstance where it did extend a private right. 30 In Transamerica, the Court both extended a private right in one circumstance and withheld a private right in another."' Nevertheless, the Court did not apply a full Cort analysis to either situation.132
Taken together, the history of the Court's articulation of the test from 1975 to 1979 presented two primary inconsistencies that both plagued the jurisprudence during that period and would continue to plague the jurisprudence in the future. First, the Court inconsistently indicated the relevance and weight of the Cort factors.13 Second, even within the first two Cort factors, the Court failed to consistently apply them; rather, the Court would occasionally blend the analysis between the first and second Cort factors.1
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In the period following Transamerica, the two inconsistencies grew. As to the first inconsistency, the Court, in some contexts, would indicate the 134. Compare Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569, 576 (noting significance of right-or duty-creating analysis and later including within that analysis the "especial benefit" test and the "intent to create a private right" test), with Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15-22 (separating "especial benefit" test from "intent to create a private right" test and eschewing rights-or duty-creating language).
were merely instructive and then apply one or more factors. 5 In still other contexts, the Court would not indicate that the Cort framework was controlling but would nonetheless apply at least some of the factors.13 Finally, some members of the Court believe Cort was effectively overruled.' As to the second inconsistency, when the Court was applying the first two Cort factors, the Court inconsistently applied them, with some cases following the right-or duty-approach espoused by Cannon and Touche,"' some cases following the approach from Cort and Transamerica,I" and some cases not specifically addressing either approach.1 4 0
These inconsistencies in the Court's jurisprudence are mirrored in the lower federal courts. Thus, for instance, as to the first inconsistency, some federal circuit courts apply the full Cort framework to implication cases. negative ramifications of maintaining the Doctrine-and I will-the inconsistencies within the positive law of the Doctrine, in combination with what substantively remains of the Doctrine, do serve as an effective mechanism of highlighting the chief problem with the Doctrine-the Doctrine is substantively empty.
A. The Tortured Evolution Redux: An Explanation
As discussed in Part II, when the Doctrine was initially formulated, the impetus 146 for its existence was the inherent judicial power of the courts. More specifically, the inquiry was simply: (1) did a federal statute prohibit the defendant's alleged conduct; (2) did the defendant engage in the conduct to the harm or detriment of the plaintiff; and (3) was the plaintiff harmed in a manner that the statute sought to prevent or deter?l 47 Notably, that three-question inquiry only involved two legal questions-did the federal statute prohibit the defendant's alleged conduct and was the plaintiff harmed in the manner that the statute sought to prevent or deter?148 And, responding to both of those legal questions revolved around either analyzing or interpreting actual statutory text or actual language within the legislative history. That is, when attempting to discern whether the alleged conduct was prohibited, the courts would look to the actual text of the statute and perhaps interpret the actual words within the text. 149 Or, when attempting to discern what harms Congress was attempting to prevent or deter, the courts looked to what was actually recorded within the legislative history.' Stated differently, there was never a situation where Congress enacted a statute but said absolutely nothing-in the statute itself or in the legislative history-about what it was attempting to achieve. Thus, both inquiries were grounded in objective, written text. Any remaining inquiry was then resolved simply by announcing the postulate that underlies the Rigsby approach: The constitutional role of the courts is to right wrongs.
Thus, all wrongs have a remedy.15 And, designing that remedy is within the inherent power of the federal courts." Accordingly, no additional inquiry was necessary to determine whether a private right of action did or should exist.
As the Doctrine grew, and most importantly as the Court attempted to cabin the Doctrine, application became more difficult and thus more inconsistent because it became less grounded in discerning Congress' reason for enactment-an analysis grounded, at least in part, in text-and more focused upon Congress' intent to create an implied right-an analysis that inherently exists in the absence of text. Thus, under the Court's Borak approach, the federal courts were no longer charged 
Id.

with a purely textual inquiry. Instead, the federal courts were charged with a modified textual inquiry. Specifically, the Borak approach required responses to all of the analytical questions from the Rigsby approach, with one fundamental change: The Court would no longer generate an implied right on the basis of its inherent powers.15 Instead, the Court would look to whether implying a right would effectuate Congress' intent. Attempting to effectuate Congress' intent requires resolving two related inquires: what did Congress hope to achieve, and would implying a right of action assist in achieving that purpose?l5 As to the former, it at first seems as though the question does not require a shift from the textual inquiry discussed under the Rigsby approach. That is, under Rigsby, the courts were charged with discerning what Congress was attempting to achieve. ' And, under the first Borak question, the courts were attempting to discern what Congress was attempting to achieve.' The similarity of language, however, can be deceptive. In practice, the initial Borak question could take two different personalities. First, the Court could analytically look to what the goals or purposes of Congress were. Under this personality, the inquiry was identical to the Rigsby inquiry. But, second, the Court could analytically look to whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. That personality of course was vastly different from the Rigsby approach-an approach that did not seek congressional sanction for generating an implied right.
As to the second Borak inquiry, the inquiry inherently seeks a subjective-as opposed to an objective-value. Under Rigsby, the Court was attempting to discern what a reasonable reader could glean from the statutory text and legislative history. That is, it was seeking to discern what a reasonable person would believe the written words meant; the Court was certainly seeking to determine congressional intent, but it was doing so using objective tests, and it was doing so using written words. The second Borak inquiry added a subjective component to the otherwise purely objective analysis because the inquiry no longer hinged purely on what a reasonable person would believe the statutory text and legislative history actually meant. Instead, the inquiry focused on, from a policy perspective, whether the Court believed permitting a private right of action was either necessary or desirable to effectuate Congress' goal. ' As a practical matter, when these two Borak inquiries were coupled, the Borak inquiry began leaning toward an inquiry of whether Congress intended to create an implied right. That movement then coalesced into the Cort framework-an inquiry that largely seeks to determine Congress' intent to create an implied right." And, of course, Cort ultimately gave way to pure textualism-an inquiry that, at least in 154 At a fundamental level, the problem with the intent-based inquiry-and the reason it will inherently give birth to inconsistencies in the positive law-is that it attempts to discern that which cannot be gathered-Congress' intent in the complete absence of text. Admittedly, that blanket statement at first seems too broad. That is, the constitutional job of the judiciary is to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.'6 In many circumstances, an intent-based inquiry is necessary. While this is of course true, as was discussed above, a fundamental distinction exists between attempting to discern Congress' intent for the purpose of interpreting a statutory provision and interpreting Congress' intent in the context of implying rights of action.
In the most common statutory interpretation case, courts are faced with the meaning of a word or phrase. 16 The question surrounding that meaning is analytically then susceptible to a variety of mechanisms to resolve the inquiry. Thus, for instance, the Court may look to the meaning of the target word in other places within the same statutory scheme or in contemporary dictionaries.167 And, while the Court may in fact look to a number of other mechanisms that are extrinsic to the text to ultimately determine Congress' intent, the Court nonetheless can always begin with the text. In contrast, in the most common implied-right case, that scenario only exists in the hypothetical sense. That is, the situations in which the Court has confronted whether to extend an implied right of action do not dangle on what a single word or phrase means.' Rather, they inherently hang on the absence The Court reasoned that use of the word "void" must have intended to, at a minimum, permit use of the statutory phrasing as a defense to contract enforcement. Id. And, once it was available as a defense, it was ordinarily permissible as a sword in of such issues. More specifically, while it is certainly possible that a statutory scheme could for instance provide for attorneys' fees but say nothing expressly about a cause of action, 6 1 that is not the circumstance the courts confront. Rather, the courts confront situations where the statutory scheme says nothing about the existence of a right of action and says nothing about ancillary matters that explicitly contemplate private litigation."o That then leaves the courts to attempt to create some mechanism to divine congressional intent through written silence. Or, in keeping with the preceding discussion, it leaves the courts to determine congressional intent to create an implied right in the absence of any written text. This is inherently an exercise in the impossible.
As the test is currently articulated,' the courts may use a number of mechanisms to determine congressional intent. But, in the first instance, congressional intent must arise from the statutory text itself.1 7 2 That articulation creates a perfect circle. That is, inherently, in any hypothetical, we would have to assume no explicit right of action exists within the statutory text; otherwise an implication analysis would be unnecessary. So, assuming no explicit right exists, the courts would then look to discern if Congress nonetheless intended to create an implied right. To determine if Congress intended to create an implied right, the courts must first look to the statutory text.
And 
175.
During a period when the Court's statement of textualism was less firm, a majority of the Court recognized that requiring affirmative evidence of congressional intent within the statutory text renders the Doctrine a "dead letter." Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 ("Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of action. The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify its evident intention to provide a cause of action."). Nevertheless, later statements by the Court indicate this language was foreshadowing. See, e.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286* 87 ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this the text into legislative history in an attempt to discern congressional intent, the inquiry is only functional in the negative.
At least in the hypothetical sense, legislative history is only useful in situations where Congress does not explicitly provide for rights of action in the statutory text but nonetheless discusses their usefulness, or lack thereof, in the legislative sessions that preceded enactment. Assuming, for purposes of the argument, that discussions had during legislative sessions are representative of "Congress' intent"-an assumption many would not make 1-the argument still only bears merit in the negative. That is, legislative discussions could be useful to the extent the history explicitly indicates Congress did not intend to create a right of action; those discussions would in fact explain the absence of explicit provisions within the text. But, it is-at best-unlikely that Congress would have affirmatively intended to create an implied right, as explicitly indicated in the legislative history, but nonetheless failed to enact statutory language to that effect. Undoubtedly, it is possible to generate hypotheticals wherein this exact scenario comes to pass. And, those scenarios are undoubtedly possible. For instance, there could have simply been a scrivener's error, I suppose, that was negligently missed by no fewer than 535 people.1 7 Even accepting those isolated, remote possibilities, though, the real question is: given the current state of the Doctrine, is the isolated, remote benefit achieved by maintaining the Doctrine worth the negative effects of maintaining At least as articulated by the Court for purposes of the Doctrine, the concept of legislative context can be defined as the act of viewing the fundamental questiondid Congress intend to create a private right of action-within the historical context in which the legislation was enacted." 9 The phrase "historical context" is then really latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.") (internal citations omitted).
176. in Curran, extended use of the concept to situations of implied ratification.' Specifically, in situations where Congress amends statutory language against a judicial backdrop of permitting implied rights but says nothing about the existence or non-existence of private rights of action, the Court held that Congress' failure to act constituted affirmative evidence of intent to permit implied rights of action." 9 Furthermore, this remained true, even if Congress' understanding of the law was in fact misplaced.' 9 ' Still, the Court stopped short of abrogating or modifying its statement in Cannon that it intended to continue using its "strict approach" to new implied rights of action.19
After Curran, the concept entered a dark period. '9 In fact, the Court did not again address the issue until it delivered its opinion in 164, 185 (1994) . But, the references were not a part of the Court's reasoning and did nothing to expand or explain the usage of the Doctrine. Thus, for instance, the Court's entire discussion of the concept in Central Bank consisted of the following: "When Congress reenacts statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction, we often adhere to that construction in interpreting the reenacted statutory language. . . . Congress has not reenacted the language of § 10(b) since 1934, however, so we need not determine whether the other conditions for applying the reenactment doctrine are present." Id. (internal citations omitted) Thus, the value of those principles stems presumably from ambiguous language within the text that can be "clarified" by analyzing the historical context of the statute's enactment.20 Again, the notion appears circular in application. Assuming again that the statutory language says nothing explicitly about the existence of any private right-an assumption necessary to even begin an implied rights analysis-then what text would be "clarified" by looking to legislative context "evidence"? As before, one can certainly generate remote hypotheticals, but the likelihood of those hypotheticals is slim. Even assuming, however, that those hypotheticals arise, the use of legislative context principles are nonetheless premised upon a speculative factual predicate. That is, the best that can be said for using legislative context-in the absence of any explicit statement by Congress-is that the results of any analysis could be correct. 210. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173* 74. 211. While not central to the point made in this section of the Article, it is interesting to note that the Court's analysis in Jackson furthers the inconsistencies that originated in Cannon and is not faithful to the Court's textualist framework. The first two analytical bases for the holding were the following: First, the Court held the statutory text included an implied private right of action. Specifically, the Court held that retaliation constitutes sex discrimination-the conduct prohibited by the statutory text-because the discharge is a response to a complaint for sexual discrimination. Id. On that basis, the Court distinguished Sandoval, reasoning the private right of action here arose from the statutory text as opposed to the administrative regulations that implemented the statutory text. Id. at 177* 78. Second, the Court premised it reasoning on the broad, remedial purposes of the statute and the best mechanism of effectuating Congress' intent. Specifically, quoting the Court's ruling in Cannon, the Court held that the statute was enacted "'to provide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] practices [,] ... ' and "this objective 'would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have effective protection against retaliation."' Id. at 180* 81. In fact, the "enforcement scheme . . . depends on individual reporting[,] . . ." and thus, "if retaliation were not prohibited, [the statute's] enforcement scheme would unravel." Id.
The first basis can be analytically dismissed as largely premised upon precedent rather than analysis. That is, the Court's first basis for permitting an implied right in the first instance is simply reliance upon Cannon. Id. at 173. That is, in fact, why Jackson is an extension case. The second analytical basis, however, is troubling from a doctrinal perspective, as it is inconsistent with Touche, Transamerica, and Sandoval and thus represents a clear departure from the Court's textualist focus on the first two Cort factors. This basis is, instead, identical to the reasoning in Borak and is consistent with the third prong of the Cort analysis. presumption remained sound, even though Title IX and section 1982, the statutory section interpreted by Sullivan, are structurally different and were enacted during different historical periods.21 I am not suggesting the analysis is wrong. It could be correct. I am not suggesting the analysis is correct. It could be wrong. The point is that it could be. And, because that is the best we can hope to achieve using legislative context as a mechanism to determine intent, we must accept that any result we reach based upon this "evidence" is simply a speculative discussion of possibilities.21 Of course, once we enter the speculative realm of possibilities, many otherwise unlikely scenarios become relevant. A case in point: What if we took the analysis in Jackson and changed it slightly. Let's say that instead of discussing whether Congress could have intended to extend an implied right for retaliatory conduct in Title IX, that it instead did not bear one singular goal.21 Let's say half of the legislators who voted in favor of the legislation never actually considered the possibility of an implied right of action for retaliation. Let's then say another quarter of the legislators did prospectively envision the existence of an implied right and intended that one exist. Finally, let's assume the remaining balance of legislators affirmatively envisioned the possibility of an implied right but did not want to create one. Is the scenario possible? What if we change that hypothetical and assume that the final quarter of legislators did not hope to accomplish anything through the legislation. Let's assume that instead their votes were responses to political pressures within their jurisdictions and they voted for the language as it existed because it lacked a real enforcement mechanism but nonetheless appeared ameliorative from the perspective of a layman. considered the possibility of creating or extending an implied right of action. Finally, the legislators could have actually relied upon the relevant judicial interpretations, and as a result, not explicitly discussed the existence of an implied right within the statutory text or the legislative history. But, each of those analytical steps are premised upon a possibility-not an actuality. Thus, they are no more or less speculative than my hypothetical.221 And, even assuming arguendo the first two presumptions are reasonable, even in the absence of any actual evidence to support it, the final presumption is premised upon an analytical leap that is virtually non-existent within other areas of jurisprudence.222 At bottom, then, the value of 219. The Court, in a variety of contexts, has stated that it presumes Congress is aware of its decisions. In contexts outside of implied-rights cases, similar presumptions are referred to as "benign fiction ] fter a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."). That is, if the Court's interpretation were actually wrong, Congress could simply legislate in derogation of it. Because Congress has not done that, it must have agreed with the result. Thus, as the reasoning would go, following some reasonable temporal period, any speculation associated with the Court's reasoning in permitting or denying an implied right is constructively ratified. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1021* 22 (1992) ("Legislative inaction is always inherently ambiguous and could reflect nothing more than a crowded legislative agenda. But as long as ratification is limited to cases where at least the relevant committees have been informed of an interpretation, and Congress reenacts the relevant legislation without change, it is probably a useful doctrine."). This argument, though, compounds the injury, as it requires even more layers of speculation. That is, to make the constructive ratification argument work, one would need to assume Congress knew about the Court's precedent, understood the precedent, and affirmatively made the decision to do nothing. 222. In any standard civil lawsuit wherein a cause of action requires an element of reliance, a party must typically demonstrate the existence of both objective and subjective reliance. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel & Waiver § 117 (2012). Thus, for example, if a plaintiff is alleging promissory estoppel as a ground for enforcement of a promise, the plaintiff will bear the burden of demonstrating that both a reasonable person would have relied upon the promise and that he/she (the plaintiff) actually relied upon the promise. Id. Focusing on the subjective prong, speculation about whether the plaintiff actually relied will be insufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence indicating the plaintiff actually relied upon the promise. Id. Commonly, a plaintiff could meet this burden through simply testifying to the fact. But, in any event, a causal link between the actual reliance and the damages (the result) must be affirmatively proven. Id. What the Court has effectively done within the legislative context arena of implied-rights jurisprudence is used a reliance-based legal theory without imparting to it the usual restrictions for its use. Just as it seems analytically thin to simultaneously say a plaintiff "relied" upon a promise without any affirmative proof of subjective reliance, it is analytically thin to suggest Congress relied upon the Court's precedents without some affirmative proof. But, the irony is that legislative context evidence is only useful when affirmative proof is absent.
legislative context evidence for purposes of implied-rights jurisprudence is identical to the value of the implied-rights Doctrine-in its current form, it exists solely to protect an unlikely possibility.
III. WEIGHING BENEFICIAL VALUE IN LIGHT OF LEGAL THEORY
As discussed in Part III, Sections B & C, the value stemming from maintaining the Doctrine is premised upon protecting a possibility; to the extent Congress says nothing explicitly about the existence of an implied right in the text of the statute and Congress says nothing negative about an implied right within the legislative history, then maintaining the Doctrine protects against the possibility that Congress harbored a secret desire to create an implied right but nonetheless failed to provide for one explicitly. Or, in the context of legislative context arguments, the Doctrine protects against the possibility that Congress both actually knew about the Court's precedents and actually relied upon those precedents by assuming the Court would create an implied right. That's the value. So, what can we weight it against? First, the Doctrine fails to achieve efficient use of judicial resources and compromises the legitimacy of the judicial system by producing inconsistent and unpredictable decisions. Second, abolition of the Doctrine would have a neutral impact on corrective justice.
A. Evaluating the Doctrine in Light ofAdministrative Efficiency Theory
For decades, the federal judiciary has experienced a "'crisis of volume"223 in its caseloads, leading a number of scholars to suggest a variety of reforms aimed at revolutionizing the federal court system to achieve better administrative 224 efficiency. As a corollary to that discussion, scholars have additionally discussed the potential of limiting access to the federal courts as a mechanism of achieving greater efficiency.22 Thus, for instance, scholars have discussed implementing user fees, compelling alternative dispute resolution, and increased involvement of the 226 judiciary in the settlement process. And, these discussions have not been limited to scholars. Rather, many of these proposals have arisen, in the first instance, through congressionally created committees.22 Furthermore, on one occasion, the Court has affirmatively stated that, within the context of the Doctrine, the Court has in fact altered its doctrinal vision in the past based, at least in part, upon the caseload of its lower courts.228 Notwithstanding the attention paid to Administrative (Apr. 2, 1990) Taken together, then, it is safe to say that the resources of the federal judiciary are strained both from a budgetary perspective and a human perspective.
913, 915 (1994) (quoting REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE 109
Furthermore, it is safe to say that the continued existence of the Doctrine has contributed to this strain. For instance, in 2008, Congress enacted the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP"). 238 Thereafter, in conformance with the increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsby had required.").
229. See While these numbers are compelling, they admittedly account for a fraction of the federal court filings in any given year.26 Additionally, given the existence of some success by plaintiffs,269 coupled with perhaps notions of corrective justice,270 one could argue the continued existence of the Doctrine serves some normative purpose. Those positions are further bolstered by visceral notions that, at least where necessary, efficiency should be sacrificed on the altar of justice.271 Taken together, then, the comparative balance facially appears to either be at a stalemate or in favor of maintaining the Doctrine in some form. That facial appearance is misleading. Perhaps the best mechanism of evaluating the relative weight of these arguments is to envision a hypothetical world without the Doctrine. Stated differently, the pivotal question seems to be whether-or to what degree-the benefits of the Doctrine can be achieved without generating waste. In a hypothetical world without the Doctrine, private rights of action could only be created explicitly by Congress, and thus, to the extent Congress failed to articulate a specific mechanism to privately enforce a federal statute, enforcement would be left to either the attorney general or an administrative agency. Immediately, four things become clear. First, the hypothetical system is not-in purpose-different from the existing jurisprudential landscape.
That is, in the existing jurisprudential landscape-a landscape where implied rights exist-the role of the federal courts is solely to discern Congress's intent. In the hypothetical system, Congress's intent controls, but the role of the federal courts to determine Congress's intent-at least to the extent of determining whether Congress intended to create a private right of action-is extinguished. Instead, Congress is charged with textually explaining its intent. Immediately, this reduces the disparity associated with having ninety-four different district court jurisdictions,27 with potentially 677 different judges,27 decide whether Congress intended to create a private right of action in literally hundreds of different federal statutes. Second, and as a result of the first, the flow of frivolous claims related to implied rights of action would cease. And, to the extent some lawyers would be willing to file such claims, procedural mechanisms of deterrence exist.274 Third, and perhaps as a corollary to the second, Congress would presumably create explicit rights of action for a number of federal statutes. Thus, some of the caseload initially eliminated by abolition would be replaced with filings related to explicit rights of action authorized by Congress.27 Finally, the current inconsistencies within the articulation and application of the Doctrine would cease, as federal courts would no longer need to struggle with determining whether 
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Additional ramifications are possible. Specifically, if the Court eliminated the Doctrine tomorrow, the remaining question would be whether the Court eliminated the Doctrine only within the context of implying new rights of action or whether the Court would eliminate the Doctrine in the context of both implying new rights of action and permitting the continued recognition of existing implied rights of action. If the Court took the former approach, then the Doctrine would technically still exist, as the Court would continue to permit cases filed pursuant to currently recognized implied rights. As a result, plaintiffs would presumably still be able to argue for extensions of those existing implied rights. If the Court took the latter approach, the Doctrine would be completely abolished. But, at least for purposes of argument, one would have to assume Congress approves of at least some of the private rights the Court has generated. Or, at a minimum, one could assume Congress, in retrospect, believes those private rights are normatively good. If true, then one would expect a flurry of legislation to fill the gaps left as a result of abolition.
Cort is mandatory or instructive.27 Instead, federal courts would simply be charged with determining whether Congress explicitly authorized a private right.
Taken together, the hypothetical jurisprudential landscape is more efficient. Even assuming Congress expended resources in proposing, drafting, and ultimately amending a variety of statutory frameworks to include explicit rights of action 277 where implied rights once existed, the resources would be expended in a manner better tailored to achieve the doctrinal purposes that currently support the Doctrine-achieving Congress's intent. After all, as between Congress and the federal judiciary, it seems unequivocal that Congress is better suited to articulate its 278 own intent.
But, more importantly, even assuming abolition resulted in no net monetary savings, abolition would at least reduce substantial waste. Specifically, it would reduce the waste associated with frivolous filings that attempt to torture the language of statutory schemes in hopes of creating implied rights, it would reduce the judicial waste at all levels of the federal courts that ultimately expend resources to dispose of those filings, and it would eliminate the waste expended by lower federal courts in attempting to discern both the proper articulation and application of the Doctrine. Furthermore, while notions of collective justice will be more fully addressed in Section C, for purposes of lingering concerns here, abolition would create no greater burden on collective justice principles than the current application of the Doctrine. Accordingly, at least for purposes of Administrative Efficiency Theory, abolition would serve a normative good.
B. Evaluating the Doctrine in Light ofProcedural Justice Theory
The credibility-and thus the legitimacy-of the judiciary and the judicial system is a delicate thing.29 Without credibility, the legitimacy of the system fails and the system collapses.28 As a general statement, Procedural Justice Theory seeks to quantify and understand what exactly gives credibility and legitimacy to 2811 institutional-governmental structures.
In attempting to define and quantify the concepts of credibility and legitimacy and their relationships with the judiciary, scholars have presented a number of models from both empirical282 and theoretical 276. See supra Part II, Section C. 277. As indicated in footnote 276, this would only be necessary if the Court were to completely abolish the Doctrine and thus not continue to permit the recognition of existing implied rights of action. 282. See, e.g., id. (stating the seven independent variables are: "(1) the degree to which those authorities were motivated to be fair; (2) judgments of their honesty; (3) the degree to which the authorities followed ethical principles of conduct; (4) the extent to which opportunities for representation were provided; (5) the quality of the decisions made; (6) the opportunities for error correction; and (7) whether the authorities behaved in a biased fashion.").
approaches.28 While empiricists and theorists have certainly taken different paths in their analysis of the variables that affect procedural justice, their arguments generally bear common themes. 284 Thus, for instance, both empiricists and theorists .
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generally agree that standing, voice, neutrality, and consistency play at least some role in perceptions ofjustice.
In analyzing each of these common variables within the context of the Doctrine, it is initially clear that standing is inapplicable. As a concept, standing refers to the extent to which "authorities engag[e] in respectful and ethical treatment of individuals." 2 89 There is simply nothing-empirical or intuitive-to indicate that the behavior of judges toward litigants would be altered by abolition of the 290 Doctrine. Thus, analyzing this particular mechanism provides nothing in the way of assessing the utility of the Doctrine. Accordingly, the remainder of this discussion will only address the mechanisms of voice, neutrality, and consistency.
In terms of voice, abolition of the Doctrine is likely to achieve a neutral result. The concept of voice, at least within the confines of Procedural Justice Theory, refers to the "extent . .. [to which] a defendant perceive[s] that he has had a genuine opportunity to state his case and that his needs are being treated as a matter of concem [.] "291 Initially, it would seem that maintaining the Doctrine enhances voice by permitting plaintiffs at least some ability to speak in court. That is, if the Doctrine were to be abolished, plaintiffs would lose the ability to even argue that a cause of action existed, resulting in more limited access to the judicial system for redress of grievances. That limitation, then, would lead to an ultimate decline in voice and thus a decline in overall credibility of the judicial system.
Admittedly, abolition of the Doctrine would lead to diminished access to the federal courts for claims whose origins were premised solely upon the Doctrine. But, that does not necessarily mean that abolition of the Doctrine would lead to diminished avenues to exercise voice for two reasons. First, federal statutes always 292 have some mechanism of enforcement-whether it be a prosecutor, an administrative mechanism, or private citizens. Thus, there is always some mechanism of exercising voice. And, at least in the empirical sense, that is all that is required to maintain a sense of credibility in the system. 295 Second, abolition of the Doctrine does not even necessarily limit access to the federal courts; rather, it would only limit access to the federal courts for claims that rest solely upon the 296 Doctrine.
Stated differently, abolition would only limit claims that are nearly destined to fail, and abolition would not limit access in cases where plaintiffs had one or more claims that are premised upon other causes of action. Accordingly, in those cases, voice in the general sense would not be limited at all, and thus, this particular variable within Procedural Justice Theory could be maintained at a relatively neutral level even following abolition.
Although the variable of voice would be largely unaffected by abolition, the concepts of neutrality and consistency would experience significant alterations as a result of abolition. The concept of neutrality refers to the extent to which "the relevant legal authority [is] honest, engaged in fact-based decision making, and functioning in the absence of bias or prejudice."
297 Stated differently, the concept of neutrality is intertwined with the notion of merit-based decision-making. In a similar vein, the concept of consistency, for purposes of Procedural Justice Theory, is defined as the extent to which "authorities treat[] similarly situated persons in a similar manner [.] " 29 8 Taken together, then, the two variables seek consistent, merit-
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based decision-making. When measured against this metric, the effects of maintaining the Doctrine are uniformly negative-at least given the Doctrine's current state. Specifically, as to consistency, the continued existence of the Doctrine has led to whole lines of inconsistency-and thus uncertainty-within the jurisprudential line."' Furthermore, while some level of inconsistency and uncertainty is perhaps to be expected within any jurisprudential line, in terms of the Doctrine, the inconsistency and uncertainty are counterbalanced by, at best, nominal substantive weight,' and, what substantive value exists within the Doctrine could be achieved even if abolition occurred. Thus, to some extent, the only true result of maintaining the Doctrine has been to affirmatively create uncertainty. As to merit-based decision-making, the existence of the Doctrine has equally negative effects. Before endeavoring to prove the point, it is necessary to identify and define "non-meritorious decision-making." Although no scholar has definitely defined non-merit-based decision-making within the context of Procedural Justice Theory, for purposes of this Article, a non-meritorious decision-through the lens of Procedural Justice Theory-is one that is either actually not based upon merit or one that generates a reasonable perception that it is not based upon merit.
In terms of the former, a decision is non-meritorious if it is not based upon any reasonable application of the Court's test. 303 In terms of the latter, a number of examples are possible. But, for purposes of this Article, the latter type will focus on transparency, as transparency creates a subjective perception of merit-based decision-making, and inversely, non-transparency creates a reasonable perception of non-merit-based decision-making.m At its core, then, this definition is not concerned with whether the result of any particular inquiry is sound. Rather, this definition is concerned with whether the analytical basis for the decision is both sound and clearly articulated.
Using this definitional framework, the continued existence of the Doctrine has resulted in a number of decisions that generate at least a reasonable perception of non-meritorious decision-making. For instance, in Jackson, the Court held Title IX's implied private right of action includes an implied right of action for retaliatory discharge.305 The Court premised its holding upon three bases, only one 306 of which is relevant here.
Specifically, the Court premised its reasoning on the broad, remedial purposes of the statute and the best mechanism of effectuating from the Court's textualist focus on the first two Cort factors. This basis is, instead, identical to the reasoning in Borak" and is consistent with the third prong of the Cort analysis. The problem, of course, is that the Court has departed from its test without explicitly recognizing it, leading to, at a minimum, the appearance of non-meritorious decision-making. By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the majority returns this Court to the days in which it created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose. In doing so, the majority substitutes its policy judgments for the bargains struck by Congress .").
315. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) . 316. In other contexts, the Court has stated that failing to follow procedure, without explaining the basis for deviation, creates a perception of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. Nat. Cable & Tele. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) ("Unexplained inconsistency is ... a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change. "); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 548 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The law has also recognized that it is not so much a particular set of substantive commands but rather it is a process, a process of learning through reasoned argument, that is the antithesis of the arbitrary."); Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 792* 93 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("At the very least, due process requires that the relevant state decisionmaker listen to the claimant and then apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision. The failure to observe these minimal procedural safeguards creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and erroneous deprivations.") (citations omitted For purposes of this Article, I shall define transparency in the same manner that Professor Luna has: "Transparency simply means the ability of the citizenry to observe and scrutinize the substantive and procedural policy choices of government, as well as their underlying rationales .. .. "318 In that vein, Professor Luna has argued that transparency requires "not only visibility of policy choices but a publicly declared rationale for these decisions."
319 Using this standard as a metric, lower federal court decisions are now potentially compromising the credibility of the judiciary by issuing orders and opinions that lack supporting rationale. For instance, in Fassina, 320 This Court has not addressed in a published opinion the issue of whether HAMP provides for a private right of action, but a host of district courts that have done so have held that it does not. We agree with those courts, and with the district court in the present case, that nothing express or implied in HAMP gives borrowers a private right of action.32 And, the cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Nelson to support that summary conclusion, contain equally summary conclusions. Thus, for instance, the analysis in Cox is limited to the following: "There is no private right of action under HAMP. Therefore, dismissal is warranted on this basis alone." 324 Similarly, the analysis in 318. See Luna, supra note 304, at 565. Similarly, Professor Hollander-Blumoff has argued that transparency is a goal of procedural justice because it provides "parties . . . data to conclude that the decisionmaking authorities and process are impartial." Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 285, at 157 . And, Professor Tyler has argued that transparency is critical to procedural justice theory because it "foster[s] the belief that decision-making procedures are neutral." Tyler, supra note 304, at 664. 
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Melton is limited to this statement: "[I]t is well established that there is no private cause of action under HAMP." 3 2 5 Thus, in this chain of cases alone, one appellate court case and no fewer than six district court cases effectively contain no supporting rationale; stated differently, each of these cases is non-transparent. And, this chain of cases is not an isolated incident. Rather, the problem is present in a 321 significant number of cases in the lower federal courts that involve the Doctrine, leading to real problems with the perception of transparency. 327 Thus, from the perspective of Procedural Justice Theory, the Doctrine, at a minimum, gives rise to the reasonable perception of non-merit-based decision-making. As a result, the continued existence of the Doctrine has the potential to undermine the credibility of the judicial system.
C. Evaluating Abolition in Light of Corrective Justice Theory
321
Originally theorized by Aristotle, the concept of corrective justice is now 329 pervasive in the law, forming a normative justification for concepts in tort law, criminal law, 3 30 equity, 331 and contract. 332 At a basic level, corrective justice seeks to correct an imbalance of loss and gain created by wrongdoing.333 Thus, at least to some extent, Corrective Justice Theory is consonant with the Court's first statement of the Doctrine: every harm deserves a remedy.
3 34 While the humble beginnings of the Doctrine were perhaps consistent with Corrective Justice Theory, the Theory no longer forms a sound normative basis for maintaining the Doctrine for two reasons: First, the doctrinal purpose underlying contemporary implied-rights jurisprudence is inconsistent with Corrective Justice Theory. And, second, even assuming the first were not true, abolition of the Doctrine would have no impact on the application of Corrective Justice Theory.
As to the former, the Court's current articulation of the Doctrine is inconsistent with Corrective Justice Theory. The sole doctrinal purpose of the Doctrine is to discern and breathe life into Congress' intent."' Thus, from the current doctrinal perspective, the question is not whether or how to right wrongs or whether or how to compensate victims. The question is simply: did Congress intend to generate an implied right? Thus, Corrective Justice Theory is simply inapplicable to the Doctrine as it currently exists.
Admittedly, that argument is self-fulfilling: once the Doctrine is defined within contemporary notions of textualism, the doctrinal purpose is no longer to correct an imbalance; rather, it is simply to achieve Congress' intent. Thus, through definition, the Theory becomes inapposite. What potentially remains, then, is the broader question of whether the Doctrine is normatively justifiable in a world where its application is unconstrained by textualism."
Analyzing this question requires the bifurcation of two broad strands of Corrective Justice Theory-Annulment Theory 3 m and Relational Theory. The Annulment Theory of corrective justice was first posited by Professor Coleman.m Professor Coleman's conception of Corrective Justice Theory uncoupled the "wrong" from the "remedy" such that a wrong need not necessarily give rise to a remedy specifically to the victim of the wrongful conduct. 3 Rather, Professor Coleman contended that corrective justice only required that either the unlawful gain or loss be annulled or corrected in some respect;3 40 no particular mode of rectification was required. ' Thus, for instance, criminal penalties "paid" to the government were sufficient to rectify wrongdoing pursuant to the Annulment Theory.
342 Under this conception of corrective justice, abolition of the Doctrine would generate neutral feedback. That is, some mechanism of enforcement presumably exists for violation of any federal statute-whether it is enforcement by the attorney general, an administrative agency, or a private citizen. Thus, so long as some structural mechanism of enforcement exists, corrective justice is satisfied.
Annulment Theory has largely yielded to a relational conception of corrective justice. 343 Pursuant to the relational conception, both the wrongdoer and the victim bear a relationship with one another such that once the wrongdoer commits the wrongful conduct, the duty to rectify that wrong is coupled with the right of the . 344 victim to receive compensation.
Pursuant to this version of Corrective Justice Theory, corrective justice is only satisfied once the wrongdoer disgorges the benefit of the wrong to the victim and the victim receives that benefit. 345 To unpack Relational Theory's application to abolition of the Doctrine, one must first understand the concept of "wrongs" within Corrective Justice Theory. Corrective Justice Theory does not define the concept of "wrong." While attempting to define the concept of "wrong" and discuss its origins is beyond the scope of this Article, it is safe-for purposes of this Article-to divide all wrongs into three broad categories: First, there are statutory wrongs that possess explicit mechanisms of private enforcement. Second, there are wrongs that, given the current state of the law, can be privately remedied through some action other than a federal, statutory enforcement mechanism.
3 49 Finally, there are wrongs that, at least given the current state of the law, could only possibly be remedied by a private enforcement mechanism pursuant to application of the Doctrine.
Initially, in terms of the first category, abolition of the Doctrine would have no impact on Corrective Justice Theory, as an explicit, direct, private means of enforcement would remain.3o Similarly, in terms of the second category, abolition of the Doctrine would generate a neutral impact, as some mechanism of private enforcement-or private correction-would remain even in the absence of a private 351 enforcement mechanism pursuant to a federal statute.
Or, stated differently, while relational corrective justice theorists couple the wrong with the remedyM no relational corrective justice theorist has posited that the theory requires that the victim of wrongdoing have a selection in the mechanism of recovery; rather, the theory, at most, requires that the victim have the opportunity for recovery from the wrongdoer. Accordingly, abolition of the Doctrine would, at most, remove one avenue of recourse, while leaving one or more avenues of recourse untouched-a result consistent with even the most expansive vision of corrective justice.
The final category-wrongs that lack any existing private remedy absent the existence of the statute-presents an additional layer of complexity. Within this category, a further delineation is necessary between wrongs that would not exist if the statute did not exist ("Pure Statutory Wrongs") and wrongs that would exist irrespective of the statute but would nonetheless be privately non-actionable if not for the Doctrine ("Non-Actionable Wrongs").
In terms of Pure Statutory Wrongs, determining the effect of abolition creates a circuitous analysis. Within the category, any claim of wrong brought pursuant to the Doctrine is in fact legislative in nature. That is, if no statutory or constitutional provision exists to prohibit or require conduct, then, at least for purposes of applying the Doctrine, no wrongdoing could exist. Or, stated differently, the statute both generates the wrong in the first instance and then, presuming the Doctrine is applicable, provides a private remedy for its violation. In this category, abolition of the Doctrine would have a neutral effect on the application of Corrective Justice Theory, as, ultimately, congressional intent will be the keystone to the claims. To explain this somewhat circular concept, we must envision a world both with the Doctrine and a world without it.
In a world with the Doctrine-and assuming it existed in its most expansive framework-the federal courts would provide a private remedy to those harmed by a party's violation of a federal statute. This private remedy would exist irrespective of whether Congress indicated an intent to create a private right-essentially we would have reverted to a Rigsby... formulation. Even under Rigsby, though, the power of the federal courts to generate implied rights, at least for Pure Statutory Wrongs, was delimited by Congress' express statements. 354 Thus, for instance, if Congress were to create a Pure Statutory Wrong and then explicitly state (in the text clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute."). of the statute) that no private remedy existed for its violation, Congress' intent would control."' And, to the extent the federal courts insisted upon creating an implied right even as against explicit congressional will to the contrary, Congress would always be free to eliminate the wrong-if Congress created the wrong, Congress has the power to destroy it. 35 In the absence of the wrong, Corrective Justice Theory would not support a remedy. 5 At bottom, application of Corrective Justice Theory to Pure Statutory Wrongs in this hypothetical world would rest on the intent of Congress, as Congress would possess the ability to craft Pure Statutory Wrongs, explicitly limit them, and ultimately eliminate them. Effectively, then, this hypothetical world has simply inverted the existing impetus: In the positive law, Congress is charged with providing the impetus for a private right of action. In the hypothetical world, courts are charged with providing the impetus for a private right of action. But, in either world, congressional intent will nonetheless control; the only true distinction is one of timing. Because the only differences between the two worlds are impetus and timing, abolition of the Doctrine would have, at most, nominal, non-substantive impact on the application of Corrective Justice Theory to Pure Statutory Wrongs.
In the final category, Non-Actionable Wrongs, abolition of the Doctrine would have no substantive impact. Before examining the impact of abolition on the concept of Non-Actionable Wrongs, it is important to reiterate the definition. A Non-Actionable Wrong within my framework is a wrong that: 1) exists independent of any statutory creation; and 2) is only actionable with the application of the Doctrine. It is relatively easy to envision wrongs that exist independent of statutory creation; the common law is, after all, rife with them. But, common law civil wrongs are, by the nature of their impetus, privately actionable. That is, common law civil wrongs exist because they were created by courts as a result of parties invoking the civil process.
Thus, common law civil wrongs are not NonActionable Wrongs. Furthermore, common law criminal wrongs-at least ones that harm individual people in a manner that would give rise to pecuniary damagesalways have a private, civil law analog. 358. It is, of course, possible that a court could generate an actionable common law civil wrong that was subsequently eliminated by the legislature. While presumably rare, this does not modify the analysis-as discussed in the section regarding Pure Statutory Wrongs, this circumstance, while perhaps cumbersome for Corrective Justice Theory, is nonetheless consistent with the extant constitutional system. In theorizing about the possibility of these as-of-yet undefined wrongs, it is not difficult to imagine that wrongs, albeit currently undefined wrongs, exist. After all, every existing wrong, whether at common law or by statute, had to be created at some point. And, it is not difficult to imagine, notwithstanding the lack of recognition in the law, that these wrongs have even been identified; the process of recognizing wrongs-from identification to recognition-is sometimes slow. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that this cohort of wrongs, once definitely identified, would be recognized in a manner that would place them beyond one of the previous definitions. More specifically, it is difficult to imagine that new wrongs would be identified and recognized through some mechanism other than the common law or statutory creation. Accordingly, assuming these theoretically possible Non-Actionable Wrongs exist, abolition of the Doctrine would generate the same impact seen in the other, previous categories-none. As a result, abolition of the Doctrine would have no impact on the application of Corrective Justice Theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, both scholars and the judiciary have been operating on the unexamined assumption that implied rights of action provide some normative utility. This Article argues that assumption is flawed for three reasons. First, an assessment of the Doctrine's beneficial value yields, at best, a nominal result, as the Doctrine only generates beneficial value in remote, isolated circumstances. Accordingly, abolition of the Doctrine would not eviscerate any real value. Nevertheless, and second, the Doctrine does give rise to negative ramifications within the fabric of the law. Specifically, the Doctrine does generate judicial waste and does generate judicial decisions that, at a minimum, raise the specter of nonmerit-based decision-making. Finally, the Doctrine's abolition would have a neutral impact on corrective justice principles, as the positive articulation of the Doctrine is inconsistent with principles of corrective justice, and even if that were not true, abolition would not eliminate avenues of redress that did not otherwise legitimately exist. Accordingly, the Doctrine should be abolished.
battery requires an intentional touching that is offensive and wrongful). This statement should not be construed, however, to say that all criminal prohibitions are actionable in civil law. Rather, it is to say that all criminal prohibitions that cause pecuniary harm to a victim have a corresponding civil law action.
360. In attempting to imagine what remains, one could easily raise the issue of constitutional wrongsviolations of a person's constitutional rights for instance. But, the ability to sue the government exists at its own affirmative leisure by virtue of extant constitutional systems. E.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 227 (1882) ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence, in all civilized nations, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission. . . ."). As indicated above, this Article presumes the constitutional structures will remain constant. Thus, the continued existence-or abolition-of the Doctrine has no substantive effect on those actions.
